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inferior for injuries inflicted upon him through the negligence of his
immediate superior, over whom he had no control: holding, in fact,
that here the negligence of the agent was the negligence of the
principal. But in the last case above cited, the court (Warden J.
diss.) say "that the servant takes upon himself all the ordinary risks
incident to the business, including liability to injury from the negligence of other servants employed with him by the common principal,
but having no control over the business or the servant who receives
the injury, we are quite ready to admit. In such case they stand
to each other as equals, and are alone liable for the injuries they
inflict."
So that, with some differences upon minor points, the principle
of the rule at the head of this article, may perhaps be considered
as established in this country.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Misisssippi Court of .Errorsand Appeals.
THE VICKSBURG AND JACKSON RAILROAD COMPANY vS. W I. L. PATTON. 1
1. The common law of England is the law of this State only so far as it is adapted
to our institutions, and the circumstances of our people, and is not repealed by
statute, or varied by usages which by long custom have superseded it.
2. By the common law of England, the owner of cattle, horses, &c., is bound to keep
them within a sufficient enclosure; and if he permit them to escape and run at
large, and wander upon the premises of another, whether enclosed or not, he is
liable for the trespass, and the cattle so trespassing may be distrained damage
fiasant. But this rule of the common law is not adapted to the circumstances
and condition of the people of this State, where the population is not dense, and
there are large tracts of uncultivated and unenclosed lands fit for the pasturage
of cattle; and, moreover, the people of the State have, from its earliest settlement,
permitted their domestic animals to run at large in the "range," and depasturo
on unenclosed lands; and hence the rule is not in force here.
3. In this State, the owner of cattle, horses, &c., which are not of a dangerous
character, may lawfully permit them to range at large on unenclosed commons;
' This case will be found reported 3 Miss. Rep. 2 George, 156. We are indebted to the
learned Reporter, James Z. George, Esq., for the report of the case.-Eds. Am.L. Beg.
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and if, in so doing, they wander upon the premises of another not enclosed by a
lawful fence, he is not liable for the trespass, and they cannot be distrained
damagefeasant.
4. The owner of unenclosed land may prosecute his lawful business thereon, but in
so doing he must exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid injuring the
cattle of others, which may have wandered on the premises.
5. A railroad company has the exclusive right to the use and possession and enjoyment of the land upon which their track is located, and they may run their engines
and cars on the same at whatever time and with whatever speed they see proper,
and not inconsistent with the safety of the persons and property committed to
their charge; but this right over the land is no higher nor more extensive than
that of its original owner; and hence if their track be unenclosed, they must run
their engines and cars with reasonable care and prudence, so as to avoid injury
to cattle which may be depasturing on the track; and if they fail to do so, they
will be liable for the injury done.
6. A railroad company is bound by law to keep the road and machinery in good
order, and to have a sufficient number of faithful and trustworthy employees to
manage and control the running of their engines and cars; and if, by their failure
in any of these respects, the cattle of another depasturing on their unenclosed
track be injured or destroyed, they will be responsible to the owner in damages.
7. Though there be negligence or fault on the part of the plaintiff, remotely
connected with the injury, yet if the defendants' fault or negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff may maintain his action
for damages.
8. It is competent for a plaintiff, on the trial of an action against a railroad company
for damages done by them to his property by the negligent and careless running
of their engine and cars, to introduce evidence to show that the general character
of the engineer in charge of the train when the injury was done, was that of a
reckless and untrustworthy agent.
9. The jury may allow exemplary damages against a railroad company, if it appear
that the property was destroyed or injured by the gross negligence or willful and
wanton mischief of its agents.

In error from the Circuit Court of Rankin County.

Hon. Jno.

E. M'Nair, judge.
The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error in the court
below, for the recovery of damages, which he alleges he had sustained by reason of the killing of several horses belonging to him,
through the negligent misconduct of the agents of the railroad
company, in running their engines and cars over them.
The defendant below pleaded the general issue, and a trial was

had, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
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The evidence on the trial is fully set out in the opinion of the
court. The instructions on behalf of the plaintiff below were as
follows :1. Under the laws of this State, the owner of unenclosed lands
has not a right to kill or destroy the horses or mules of another
found on such land; and railroad corporations in this State, unless
under special provision of the charter conferring such right, are not
exempt from this principle.
2. That corporations are liable for the tortious acts or negligence
of their servants and agents in the same manner as individuals,
unless released by their charters.
3. That the defendants in running their locomotives and trains
over their road, are bound to exercise such reasonable care and
caution as may be necessary at any point of their road to prevent
injury to the property of other persons, and by reason of the want
of such reasonable care and caution by defendants, or their agents
or officers or servants, injury is inflicted by their trains upon the
property of other persons, the defendants are liable in damages to
the owner of such property so injured.
4. If they find, from the evidence, that at the time mentioned in
the complaint the defendants were running their train over the
road without the officers and machinery, or either, usual and necessary to prevent collision and injury to persons or property of others,
and that by reason of such want of officers and machinery, or either,
and without any fault of plaintiff in the present case, the horses and
mules mentioned in the complaint were run over and killed or rendered useless to the plaintiff by the defendants' train, they should
find for the plaintiff.
5. if they find from the evidence that the plaintiff's property
mentioned in the complaint was destroyed on defendants' railroad
track, in consequence of a want of reasonable care and diligence
on the part of the defendants or their agents employed on the train
at the time, and without any culpable neglect of the plaintiff
directly causing the injury, they should find for the plaintiff.
6. That where there is mutual negligence between "the plaintiff
and defendant, the plaintiff may still recover, if the negligence of
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the defendant was the direct cause of the injury complained of,
and the negligence of the plaintiff but the remote cause of such
injury; and if they find in this cause, from the evidence, that there
was such mutual negligence, and that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the remote, and that of the defendant the direct cause of the
injury complained of, they should find for the plaintiff."
It is not necessary to the understanding of the opinion of the
court, that the instructions given in behalf of the defendant should
be set out.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HANDY, J.-This action was brought by the defendant in error
against the plaintiff in error, to recover damages occasioned by the
locomotive and cars of the railroad running over and killing or
wounding several horses and a mule belonging to the defendant in
error; which injury is alleged to have been caused by the negligence,
mismanagement, and improper conduct of the railroad company or
its agents..
It appears by the evidence in the record, that the injury was
done in July, 1851, when the cars were on their usual morning
trip from Brandon to Jackson; and that the slaves of Patton had
ridden the horses to the place where they were at work in the woods,
about a mile from the residence of Patton, and along a neighborhood road which crossed the track of the railroad, and which was
the road used in going from Patton's residence to the place where
his slaves were at work. The animals appeared to have been
turned loose to pasture, their owner being in the habit of* pasturing them upon unenclosed and uncultivated lands adjoining the
railroad track, owned by other persons, and which had been used
by the neighborhood generally for pasturage for a great number of
years, without objection, such animals having been accustomed to
run at large for pasture in the neighborhood since, at least the year
1829. About the time the injury occurred, one of the horses was
seen by a witness, standing on the railroad track where the neighborhood road crosses it, and the others were standing near the intersection of the two roads. From that point to the place where the
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horses were visible by persons on the cars coming from Brandon, it
was not less than two hundred yards, and probably more ; and from
the same point to the culvert, where the collision took place, it was
a further distance of about one hundred and forty yards, the track
being for this latter distance, thickly set on both sides with bushes,
and on an embankment four or five feet in height. On the morning
of the occurrence, the cars were running with unusual rapidity, such
as had never been seen before by a witness who lived near the road.
This witness was in full view of the cars and of the animals, when
the locomotive came within sight of the animals. The whistle was
sounded before reaching the place of intersection where they were
standing, but there was no change of speed perceived, nor any
effort to stop the locomotive, by applying the brake or reversing the
engine. When the locomotive approached within about one hundred
yards of the place where the animals were standing, they turned
and ran down the track until they reached the culvert, and being
unable to go further or to escape from the track, they were there
overtaken by the locomotive, and mangled or killed; and the locomotive thrown from the track down the embankment, a distance of
some thirty or forty feet.
The train at the time consisted of the locomotive and tender, a
negro car, a passenger car, and five freight cars; and the persons
in charge of it were the engineer, the conductor, and a negro fireman. There was a grade on the track from the culvert to the
point where the horses were first visible to the engineer, at the rate
of twenty-four feet to the mile, by measurement, and a moderate
curve in the track.
It was proved by an experienced engineer that the engine used
on this road at the time, was in good condition-that such an engine,
when running at the speed of twenty miles an hour, can be stopped
in six hundred feet, by applying the brakes, which should be in the
front and rear of every car,' and worked by competent hands, and
by reversing the engine in due time ; and if there be sand boxes, to
scatter sand upon the track, which is necessary in case it should be
wet, he was of opinion that the engine could not have been
stopped in six hundered feet upon this road, from his knowledge of
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its condition and the train usually attached to it-that if it was wet
at the time, the difficulty of stopping .would have been thereby
increased-but that if every thing had been in perfect order, six
hundred feet is a sufficient distance for stopping the engine-that
nine hundred feet would be necessary if the track was wet, and there
was a grade of even two feet-that brakes, with a sufficient number
of brakemen, and sand boxes filled with dry sand, are essential to
the management of the train with safety.
There was testimony showing that there was much grass on the
track at the time, and also testimony to the contrary; and it was
shown, that with the track in that condition, it would have been
difficult to stop the locomotive; and if the track was in that state,
that it was in a very bad condition.
There was also some testimony showing that the track was wet
at the time; but there is a clear preponderance of evidence to show
to the contrary, that the weather was clear, hot and dry, and that
there was no dew on the track at the time.
As to the character of the engineer, the testimony is conflicting.
Bat while there is testimony to show that he was attentive and
competent, the weight of evidence tends to show that he was not a
careful and prudent man; that he was addicted to dissipation and
drunkenness, and sometimes not sober when in the discharge of his
duties as engineer; that it was often necessary to awake him in the
morning for the cars, after he had been drinking; that there was a
constant sounding of the whistle on the morning of this occurrence,
and before reaching the point where the animals were found, so
much so as to attract the observation of the neighbors at the unusual
rapidity and noise of the cars; and that the engineer was in the
habit of sounding the whistle when there were no cattle on the
track, and when there was no occasion for it, and wantonly.
It was in proof by a witness, who was on the locomotive with
the engineer at the time, that the engineer bad been drinking liquor
that morning, enough to feel it, but "was not drunk, but lively ;"
that. when they first saw the animals, which was at a distance of
about two hundred yards from the place where they were crossing
the road, this witness remarked to the engineer that there was
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danger, and that he replied, he did not care, let them get out of
the way; that he did nothing to stop the train until the locomotive
struck the first of the animals, and then the fireman sprang to the
brake and witness helped him, but without effect; that about that
time, the engineer reversed the engine; that no order was given to
apply the brake, the fireman acting of his own accord, and the witness, to save himself.
The testimony of this witness is impeached by the production of
a letter, testified by a witness to have been written, at his instance,
shortly after the occurrence, to the president of the railroad company, exculpating the engineer from all blame; which letter he
denied in his disposition that he ever wrote or authorized to be
written. IBut in many material respects his testimony was sustained by the other witnesses; and the question of credibility was
one which the jury had the right to determine, under all the circumstances.
It was further proved that the conductor, a lad of about seventeen years of age, was in the passenger car when the collision took
place, and had been there for some time, reading a magazine or
something of that kind, and paying no attention to the progress of
the train; and that he knew nothing of the danger until he heard the
sound of the whistle, when he looked out and saw the animals running; he sat down immediately and felt a sudden motion like that
caused by reversing the engine. He then got out of the cars and
found that the engine had run off the track, the negro car across
the track, and the passenger car thrown nearly off the track, the
animals lying dead or wounded upon the track. This witness
proved that the cars started behind their usual time that morning
from Brandon, and were running at the rate of eighteen or twenty
miles an hour when the collision occurred.
It was further proved in behalf of the railroud company, by a
witness, who was not an engineer, but had been superintendent of
this railroad for many years, that he was at the place on the day
after the occurrence, and was of opinion that if the engine was
running at its usual speed and there was dew and grass on the
track, it could not have been stopped, at the point where the acci-
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dent occurred, in less than one thousand to fifteen hundred feet,
with every appliance; that there was a curve and a grade descending
towards the culvert, from Brandon, of thirty-two feet to the mile,
as he judged by his eye; that there was much grass on the track,
and he considered the road, and cars, and locomotive in good condition; that the grass would cause the wheels to slide, and render
it difficult to stop the cars.
There was not more than one brake to the train, no brakemen,
and no sand-boxes, and the track was not fenced in or enclosed.
This appears to be the substance of the evidence, and it is here
stated so much at length, in order that some of the questions presented in the case, and depending upon it, may be properly comprehended.
The value of the property destroyed, or injured, was proved to
be $550 or $600, and some further damage is shown to have
resulted from the injury. The jury found a verdict of $1,211 90,
which exceeded the value of the property and actual damage
proved; and the defendant below moved for a new trial. First,
because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence; and second,
because the damages were excessive. This motion was overruled,
and the case is brought here for alleged error in that, and in the
ruling of the court upon the trial, to which exceptions were taken.
Several questions of great importance, and of the gravest public
interest, are here presented for the first time for the determination
of this court. Fortunately these questions, though new in this
court, have engaged the attention of the most learned courts in this
country and in Englaod; and in the consideration of them, in addition to the aid of the able arguments of the counsel for the respective
parties, we have had the benefit of numerous adjudications of other
judicial tribunals, involving the same or similar questions. By
such aids, we were enabled to come to conclusions satisfactory to
our minds, upon a subject, of such profound importance in its direct
and collateral bearings, and will proceed to state the views we take
of the various questions presented for decision.
It is insisted in behalf of the railroad company, that by their
charter, they had the absolute and exclusive right to the land
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covered by their track, with the privilege of running their engines
and cars at whatever times and at whatever speed they saw proper,
without obstruction; that they were not required by their charter
nor by any other law, to fence their track; that the exclusive property in it being in the company, it was a wrong on the part of
the owner of these animals to suffer them to be upon the track;
that it was his duty to keep them within his own enclosure, or upon
his own premises, and that if injury occurred to them, in consequence of being suffered to go at large and where they might be
upon the railroad track, and thereby interfere with the legal and
proper business of the railroad, it was by the plaintiff's own wrong,
for which he is entitled to no redress; that being on the road
wrongfully, and in derogation of the lawful business of the company, they were not bound to pay any attention to them, and
might lawfully run their engines and cars in their proper business,
without regard to them, and without responsibility for their destruction.
The first point of inquiry, therefore, is, what are the rights and
duties of the railroad company, in the use of their road, with reference to the rights of others ?
It is certainly true, that they have the absolute and exclusive
right to run their engines and cars upon their track in furtherance
of the objects of their charter, without interference by others; and
that no one else has any right whatever to the use or occupancy
of their track. But this right is to be exercised in subordination
to the general laws and policy of the State, unless where the company is, expressly or by necessary implication, excepted from their
operation. And while their duties to those immediately connected
with them in the objects of their business, are faithfully to be preformed, the rights of others collaterally interested in their operations,
are not to be disregarded. The highest of these duties is that which
arises from a proper regard for the safety of persons who entrust
their lives to the care and skill which are bound to be employed in
the use of vehicles of so much hazard and danger. In this respect,
the law imposes upon such companies the greatest strictness in
providing all things necessary to the safety of passengers, which
80
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care, skill and foresight require; and that their agents should be
faithful and vigilant, and in all respects competent and trustworthy
of the great responsibilities committed to them. Without an implied
guaranty by such companies, for fidelity in these respects, the
dangerous power given to them could never have been granted.
The relations of the company with other persons, growing out of
the use of their franchise, are also governed by the general rules of
law, from which, for the most part, they are not exempted by their
charter. Their right of exclusive use and enjoyment of their track,
confers no power to violate the rights of others with which the
exercise of their right may come in conflict; but must be exercised
so as not to injure the rights of others. It is no greater than the
owner of the land, in fee simple, had before it was acquired by the
company; and if such owner had no right, in carrying on his lawful
business upon his own unenclosed land, to destroy his neighbor's
beasts found upon it, neither could this company, in conducting
their business, justifiably destroy such animals, unless the act was
unavoidable, after the exercise of all due skill, prudence and care,
by the company and its agents. For the rights and powers of the
original proprietor, with regard to the land, were at least as high
as those of the railroad company, and the rights of the owner of
the animals, whatever they were, were as much under the protection
of the law as those of the company. The idea is wholly inadmissible,
that in giving the company the use of the land covered by their
track, for the purpose of running their engines and cars, it was
intended to confer upon the corporation privileges and immunities
in the land, which the original owner, who had the full and absolute
dominion over the same property, to all intents and purposes, did
not possess; and it is manifest, that no immunity being provided in
their charter, they hold the land subject to the laws and general
policy of the State, with no power, as to dominion over it, superior
to that of the original proprietor.
Let us, then, test the rights and duties of the parties to this controversy, by the same rules of law applicable to the relations of the
proprietor of the land before it was granted to this company, and
the owner of the animals, the subject of this suit.
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Suppose such proprietor, not having enclosed his land, had had
upon it works, in which dangerous machinery was employed in
carrying on his lawful business; or suppose he had had a railroad
upon it, and in full operation, performing all the business of such
a work, for his individual benefit and profit, but with no safeguards
to protect his works against injury from the cattle of his neighbors; what is the rule by which, under such circumstances, he
must be governed in the use of his property, in the way he had seen
proper td use it, with reference to the encroachment of his neighbors' beasts upon his land, and their interference with his business?
It is clear, that there wis no right in his neighbors to permit their
cattle to encroach upon is property. But if they had a right to
suffer their cattle to go at large in a neighboring range or common
pasture, ordinary prudence would dictate, that the proprietor of
the land and works should take proper means, by fences or otherwise, to prevent intrusions which would in all probability be made
by them upon his property, and to the injury of his business; and
if he omitted to do so, and without such precautions, continued to
pursue his business, and use his property, regardless of the fact
that the cattle were in the way, and, without the necessary care
and prudence to avoid injury to them at the time, and the cattle
should be destroyed, he would be responsible; unle.s under our
laws the cattle would be trespassers, and liable to be distrained
damagefeasant.
The question, then, is, whether by our laws and policy a man is
compelled to keep up his cattle, so as to prevent depredations upon
his neighbor's unfenced and unenclosed premises; or whether a Uat
is not justified in suffering his cattle to go at large in the range or
common pasture, without liability to those on whose premises, not
being lawfully fenced, they may go; and whether it is not required
that the owner of lands before he can justify an injury done to his
neighbor's beasts, which have come upon his lands, must not show
that the trespass was done notwithstanding he had such a fAice as
is required by law, or that the injury was unavoidable, and such as
could not have been prevented by due care and prudence.
It is urged in behalf of the railroad company, that by the rule
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of the common law, the owner of the cattle was bound to keep them
within his own enclosure; that the owner of lands was not required
to guard against their intrusion upon his premises, but that the
owner of cattle was bound to prevent them from entering upon the
premises of others, whether fenced or not; that this rule of the
common law prevails here, and that it is unlawful to permit cattle
to graze in a neighboring range or common, or unenclosed pasture,
from which they may go upon the premises of individuals to their
injury; and consequently, that the act of the plaintiff, in permitting
his animals to go at large, being unlawful, he is not entitled to any
redress for their loss, which resulted from his own wrong.
These positions are sustained by decisions of the Supreme Courts
of New York, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, founded on
the reason, that the rule of the common law prevailed in those
States, which compelled persons to keep their cattle off their neighbor's lands, and holding that that principle is applicable to cattle
suffered to go at large and found upon railroad tracks, where they
On the contrary, a different rule is held in Conwere destroyed.
necticut, Indiana, Ohio, South Carolina, and Alabama; Stadwell
ervs. Ritch, 14 Conn. 293 ; Seeley vs. Peters, 5 Gilman, 1.80;
whaker, vs. Oleveland Railroad Oompany, 3 Ohio State R. 172;
Tr~ipp vs. .asell, et al., 1 Strob. Law R. 176; RV'asi. and Chatt.
Railroad vs. Peacock, 25 Alabama, 232; and the rule of the common law is held not to prevail, because it is inapplicable to the
condition and circumstances of the people of those States, and
repugnant to the custom and understanding of the people, from
their first settlement down the present time.
It cannot be denied that the common law of England is the law
of this State only so far as it is adapted to our institutions and the
circumstances of the people, and is not repealed by statutes, or
varied by usages which, by long custom, have superseded it; and
that where the reason of it ceases, the rule itself is inapplicable.
In a densely populated country like England, with small farms and
but few cattle, the reason of the rule that every man shall prevent
his cattle from going at large, is apparent; and the rule prevails,
because it is suited to the condition of that country. The policy
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of the common law, therefore, was, that it was more convenient
that a man should be bound to fence his cattle in, than that he shall
fence his -neighbors'out. The same reason may render it applicable
in many of the States of this Union, and in those where this rule
has been held to prevail.
But the circumstances of our people are widely different from
those of such communities. This State is comparatively new, and
for the most part sparsely populated, with large bodies of woodlands and prairies, which have never been enclosed, lying in the
neighborhoods of the plantations of our citizens, and which, by
common consent, have been understood, from the early settlement
of the State, to be a common of pasture, or, in the phrase of the
people, the "range," to which large numbers of cattle, hogs, and
other animals in the neighborhood, not of a dangerous or unlawful
character, have been permitted to resort. These large numbers of
cattle and other animals are necessary to the wants and business
of the people, whose great interest is in agriculture; and the large
and extensive tracks of land suitable for the pasture of stock, are
most generally not required by the owner for his exclusive use.
If so required, no one questions his right to fence them in, and to
appropriate them accordingly. But until he does so, by the
universal understanding and usage of the people they are regarded
as commons of pasture, for the range of cattle and other stock of
the neighborhood.
This policy is sanctioned by strong reasons of public convenience,
growing out of the condition of the people. The greater part of
the lands of the State have been comparatively but recently brought
into cultivation. When purchased and taken possession of by their
owners, they were wild. The timber had to be cleared, buildings
erected, and as much land as could be, brought into speedy cultivation. The settler had but little time to enclose his lands, and
therefore he made enclosures only as his necessities and convenience
required. He turned his cattle into the range, -because it was more
convenient to do so than to build fences and keep them within his
own enclosures. His neighbors did the same thing; and the practice became genral, and thus the usage has established the general
rule among the people, that it is more convenient to make fences to
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keep the cattle of others out from lands not intended to be used for
pasture, than to fence their own cattle within their enclosures.
And by this custom a large amount of pasture, which would otherwise be lost, becomes useful and valuable, in rearing great numbers
of cattle and stock of various kinds, contributing greatly -to the
convenience and emolument of our people. It is also highly convenient in rendering a man safe in pasturing his own cattle on his
own unenclosed lands, which he could not do with safety if the
common law rule prevailed; because his cattle, when pasturing
upon his own unfenced lands, would be liable to intrude upon his
neighbor, and be subjected to the common law rule arising from the
trespass. He would, therefore, be compelled to enclose his own
pasture-lands before he could safely use them as such; and such a
necessity in the condition of the lands of this State, would be a
great public grievance.
For these considerations, the custom has grown up among the
people, and is well settled by universal acceptation, that a man is
entitled to permit his cattle and other stock to go at large in the
neighborhood range, and is not liable as a trespasser for the damage
done by them to the premises of his neighbor, which are not enclosed
by a lawful fence. This being the condition of the people from
the first settlement of the State, and the same reasons of convenience still prevailing, it is manifiest that the rule of the common
law is wholly unsuited to our circumstances, and, upon well settled
doctrine, cannot be held to be applicable here.
If there could be a reasonable doubt upon this point, it must be
removed by the provisions of our statutes. These provisions are
utterly irreconcilable with the rule of the common law, and are
made with reference to the contrary policy which has existed here.
The twelfth section of the Act of 1822, Hutch. Code, 276, which
was a re-enactment of an Act passed in the early history of the
State, provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person to drive
any horses, mules, cattle, hogs, or sheep, from the range to which
the same may belong." The next section provides penalties for the
violation of that provision. The fourteenth section prohibits animals
of a particular character from being suffered to run at large in the
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woods, or in any enclosed range. Other sections make it the duty
of each owner of horses, or other stock, to have a brand and earmark, and to have the same recorded; the object of which was, that
the stock of each owner in the range might be known and designated.
And the seventeenth section prohibits the owner from sending or
permitting any slave or Indian to go "into any of the woods or
ranges of this State," to mark or brand any cattle, &c.
These provisions clearly recognize the right of any owner of
horses, cattle, or other stock, to put them in the range, which
means the unfenced wood lands, or other pasture lands in the
neighborhood.
Again. The Act of 1822, Hutch. Code, 278, 279, which is a
transcript of the Territorial Act of 1807, provides that, "if any
horses, &c., shall break into any grounds enclosed with a strong
and sound fence, five feet high, well staked and ridered, or sufficiently locked, and so close that the beasts breaking into the same
could not creep through, which shall be deemed a lawful fence,"
the owner shall be liable to the party injured, for damages. This
provision is altogether useless, if the owner was bound to keep his
cattle within his own enclosure ; for by that rule he was liable for
damages to the party injured by the trespass of his cattle, whether
his premises were fenced or not. But it is plain that it was the
object of this statute to change the rule of the common law, and to
provide that the party whose cattle should intrude upon the premises of another, should not be liable for damages, unless the party
injured kept a lawful fence. This intention clearly appears from
the third section of the same Act, which prohibits "any person
i7juredfor want of such sufficient fence," under a heavy penalty,
from wounding or killing any horses, inules, or other stock, trespassing upon their premises.
The policy upon which these enactments are founded, and the
acts themselves, clearly establish two principles-first, that the
owner of cattle may rightfully suffer them to go at largefor Paisture
upon the neighboringrange; and, secondly, that the owner of lands
is bound to keep them fenced with a laufulfence, if he would prevent the intrusion of cattle upon them, and, otherwise, that he can-
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not complain that the intrusionis unlawful. And it has been held
by this court, that under these provisions, when cattle break through
an insufficient fence into the premises of a party, he has no right
of action for damages, and cannot distrain damage feasant, which
were clear rights at the common law; thus conclusively settling
that the rules of the common law are not in force here. Dickson
vs. Parker,3 How. 220.
It is to be observed, that the cases above adverted to, holding
that cattle found upon a railroad track may lawfully be destroyed,
in the prosecution of the business of the company, are founded
upon the reason, that the owner was compelled by the rule of the
common law to keep them up, and that it was by the violation of
that common law duty that the cattle were at large and upon the
road; and, therefore, that the owner, having been guilty of a
wrong, is entitled to no redress against the company. Having
shown that this rule of the common law does not prevail here, the
argument founded upon it fails; and the conclusion follows, that
the plaintiff cannot be considered as a wrong-doer in suffering his
animals to go at large for pasture, and that the animals were not
unlawfully on the railroad track so as to justify the company in
destroying them, without using all due care, prudence and skill, to
avoid their destruction.
But it is contended that the railroad company, having the exclusive use of their track, the plaintiff's cattle were improperly there,
interfering with the lawful business of the company to the hazard
of the lives of their passengers, and impeding the speed which, from
the very nature of their business, they were authorized to use in
running their engines upon their track, and, therefore, that the
injury was done without wrong on the part of the company.
This position is met with so much clearness and force by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in the case above cited, as to justify our
adoption of the views of the subject there taken. The court say,
"The defendant's right to the exclusive and unmolested use of its
railroad track, is undeniable. And it must be conceded that the
plaintiff had no right to have his hogs on the track, and that they
were there improperly. But how came they there ? If the plain-
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tiff bad placed them there, or knowing them to be there, had
omitted to drive them off, he would have been, perhaps, precluded
from all claim to compensation, But it would appear that, in the
exercise of the ordinary privilege of allowing these animals to be
at large, by the plaintiff, they accidentally, and without his knowledge, w-,ndered upon the railroad track. The right of the defendant to the free, exclusive, and unmolested use of its railroad, is
nothing more than the right of every other land proprietor in the
actual occupancy and use of his lands, and does not exempt it from
the duty enjoined by law upon every person so to use his own property as not to do any unnecessary and avoidable injury to another.
Finding the animals upon the track, it was the right, and indeed
the duty, of the agents of the company to drive them off, but not
to injure or destroy them by unnecessary violence. The owner of
a freehold estate in lands, enclosed by a lawful fence, has the right
to expel trespassing animals which have broken through his enclosure;
but in doing so, he would become liable in damages to the owner of
the animals, if they be injured by the use of unnecessary and improper means, although the latter would be bound to make reparation
for the injury done to the former, by the trespassing animals. It
is not pretended that the railroad of the defendant was under enclosure, through which the plaintiff's creatures had broken. It is true,
that there is no law here requiring railroad companies to fence
their road. But when they leave their roads open and unfenced,
they take the risk of intrusions from animals running at large, as
do other proprietors who leave their lands unenclosed. If a farmer
undertake to cultivate his ground in corn without enclosing it, he
would be doubtless troubled by the destructive intrusions of cattle
running at large; but without a sufficient fence, he could not maintain an action against the owner of the animals for the trespass.
The defendant constructed its railroad with a knowledge that it was
the common custom of the country to allow domestic animals to run
at large upon the unenclosed ground of the neighborhood; and without the precaution of enclosing its railroad, the company could not
sustain an action against the owner of such animals at large, as
might happen to wander upon the track of the road. The owner of
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the animals, in allowing them to run at large, takes the risk of the
loss or injury to them by unavoidable accident; and the company,
in leaving its road unprotected by enclosure, runs the risk of the
occasional intrusions of such animals upon its road, without any
remedy against the owner."
It is a sound and revered maxim of the law, that though a man
may do a lawful thing, yet if damage thereby befall another, he
shall be answerable for it,if he could have avoided it. Broom,
Legal Maxims, 275; Aldridge vs. Great Western B. B. Co., 4 Scott,
N. R. 156. This principle is entirely at war with the doctrine
apparently sanctioned by some of the cases cited in behalf of the
plaintiff in error, that the nature of their business required them
to use great speed, and therefore, that they were justified in running their engines regardless of cattle upon the road, with whatever
speed they might think fit, without liability to the owner of the
cattle thereby destroyed. Such a doctrine is unfounded in sound
law, and would be dangerous and mischievous in the extreme, both
to the lives of passengers of the company, and to persons whose
rights may be collaterally involved in their operations. For such
a rule, while it would give to conductors and engineers upon such
road, a free license wantonly to destroy cattle which might casually
be upon their track, and in any way impede their progress, would
greatly endanger the safety of travellers on the road, by subjecting
their lives to the capricious exercise of this liberty by the agents of
such companies. These mischiefs would almost necessarily result
from such a principle, if sanctioned; and the consequence would be,
that all confidence in such works would be destroyed; and; instead
of being sources of public convenience, as they would be under
the salutary restraints of law which bind the citizen, they would
be converted into instruments of private oppression and public
calamity.
Again, it is said that the destruction of the plaintiff's animals
was in consequence of his suffering them to be in a situation exposed
to destruction, and of which he was bound to take notice; and that
the rule is, that where the injury has resulted from the fault or
negligence of the plaintiff, or from the fault or negligence of both
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parties, without any intentional -wrong on the part of the defendant,
there can be no recovery.
It is already shown, that it was not unlawful in the plaintiff to
suffer his animals to go at large in the neighborhood of the railroad,
and as that was the remote cause of the injury, it cannot be said to
be a wrong or gross negligence. It is true, the highest degree of
prudence might have induced him not to suffer his cattle to be at
large near the track, and exposed to its dangers. But was he bound
to use such precaution? He is to be presumed to have acted with
a knowledge of the relative legal rights and liabilities of himself and
the company. In suffering his cattle to range, exposed to the dangers of the railroad, he subjected himself to the hazard of all that
the company might legally do in destroying them, but to nothing
further. And they were justified in destroying them only in the
necessary prosecution of their business, and when the act should
become unavoidable, after the use of such care, prudence and skill,
as a discreet man would employ to prevent it. He had the right
to act, and must he presumed to have acted, on this rule; and if he
suffered by it, but without any violation of it by the company, he
would be without redress. But he was not bound to lose his right
to range his cattle near the railroad and keep them enclosed, upon
the assumption that they would be illegally destroyed by the company, if suffered to go at large near the road. He had as high a
right to range his cattle in the neighborhood of the road, as the
company had to run its engines and cars along their track; a right
prior in time to that of the company, and one equally entitled to be
noticed and respected by the company. If the plaintiff was bound
to respect their right to run their cars 4nd engines, by keeping his
cattle enclosed, in order to prevent their exposure to the dangers of
the road and damage to the company, by parity of reason was it
the duty of the company to respect his prior right of range, by keeping fences to protect their road from incursions of his cattle, and to
save him from injury by their destruction. The road was under no
legal obligation to fence its track, nor was the plaintiff bound by law
to keep his animals enclosed, in order to prevent their exposure to
the dangers of the road; and so far the legal obligations are equal.
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But the same rule of prudence that would require the plaintiff to
enclose his cattle, in order to avoid the danger of destruction by
the railroad, would also demand of the company, as a matter of
protection to its property and of safety to the lives of its passengers,
to fence its track. If there is any difference in the degrees of duty,
it would appear that the latter was much the higher and more
imperative, and the delinquency on the part of the company in
neglecting it, would, of course, be greater.
It is, therefore, manifest, that the injury cannot be ascribed to
the fault or negligence of the plaintiff, in which the defendant is
not inculpated. And the most favorable point of view in which it
can be regarded for the defendant is, that both parties were mutually
in fault, and both the immediate cause of the injury. In such a
case, unless the injury be malicious and wanton, the party injured
cannot maintain an action, because the injury has been caused by
his own wrong.
But this rule is subject to several qualifications which render it
inapplicable to the facts of this case.
1. It does not apply where the party committing the injury might
have avoided it by the use of common and ordinary caution; and
this is the rule, even where the remote cause of the injury is the
unlawful act of the party complaining. This is held by numerous
authorities. In The Mayor of Colchester vs. Brooke, 7 Q. B., 53
Eng. Com. Law Rep. 339, the plaintiff had deposited and kept a
bed of oysters in the channel of a navigable stream, thereby creating
a public nuisance; yet the defendant was held liable for running
his vessel upon the bed of oysters, greatly injuring them, there
being room to pass in the stream without it, because the injury
could have been avoided by the use of reasonable care and diligence.
In Bird vs. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628; 13 E. C. L. R., the defendant
had set a spring-gun upon his walled garden, to protect his property
from being stolen, and the plaintiff, in climbing over the wall in
pursuit of a stray fowl, was shot by the gun; it was held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, although he brought the
injury upon himself by a trespass upon the defendant's enclosure.
In the case of Deane vs. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489; 2 E. 0. L. R., it
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is said that the rule "that you shall do no more than the necessity
of the case requires, when the excess may in any way be injurious
to another, is a principle which pervades every part of the law of
England, criminal as well as civil, and, indeed, belongs to all law
that is founded on reason and natural equity." The same rule is
held in Lynch vs. Burden, 41 Ib.422 ; Butterfield vs. PForrester,
11 East, 58; VFere vs. Lord Cawdor,lb. 467; Vaughan vs. Aenlove,
82 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 211; New Hfaven S. and T. Co. vs. Vanderbilt, 16 Conn. R. 421; Beers vs. Rous. Railroad Co., 19 Ib.
556, and is involved in Parkervs. Dickson, 8 How. 219.
Another qualification to the general rule, that there is no liability
upon the defendant when the plaintiff has contributed to the injury,
exists when, though both parties be in fault, the defendant has been
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. This is well
settled by authority. Davies vs. Jann,10 Mees. & Wells. 545;
Trow vs. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co., 24 Vermont Rep. 494, and cases
cited; 3 Ohio State Rep. 194; Broom, Leg. Max. 283.
It may, therefore, be considered as settled law, that though there
be negligence or fault on the part of the plaintiff remotely connected
with the injury, yet, if at the time the injury was done, it might
have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, prudence and
skill, on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff may maintain his
action for the injury.
It follows from these views of the case, that the instructions
granted on the trial in behalf of the plaintiff were correct; and that
the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 14th, and 16th instructions
in behalf of the defendant were erroneously granted, and the 13th
instruction is questionable. And though the verdict was contrary
to the instructions given in behalf of the defendant, it should not
for that reason be set aside; because those instructions were erroneous, and should not have been given.
We will next consider the objections taken to the admissibility of
certain evidence in behalf of the plaintiff. This testimony tended
to show that the engineer on duty at the time this injury was done, had
previously been in the habit of sounding the whistle when there was
no occasion for it, to frighten animals and to annoy the neighbors
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on the road. There was testimony showing -him to be a man of
dissipated habits; and the object of the testimony objected to, with
other evidence to the same point not objected to, was to show his
character to be that of a reckless and untrustworthy agent. It is
not denied that it was competent to show the character of the agent,
and his unfitness for the responsible trust reposed in him. It is the
imperative duty of such companies to provide skilful, competent,
and trustworthy agents, and they are responsible upon their failure
to do so, for the consequences of their neglect of duty. Stokes vs.
Saltonstall, 13"Peters, 181 ; 14 How. 468. Upon a question involving his character and fitness for his trust, and the consequent
responsibility of the company for his delinquency in these respects,
it is not only competent but necessary to inquire into his previous
habits and conduct, in order to show that the alleged misconduct at
the time of the injury was in keeping with his general character.
Frequently it may be out of the power of a party to show positively
the reasons of the particular delinquency of such an agent; and in
such cases it is proper and necessary to show his general character
in order to explain his conduct at the time.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error place their objection on the
ground that this testimony tended to create a prejudice against
the Company, and thereby increase the damage. This may be true,
though it does not appear to have been offered for that purpose;
but if the testimony was competent to show that the Company had
employed a reckless and incompetent engineer, as it clearly was,
that being a material point involved in the suit, it cannot be said
that it should have been excluded. Being competent upon the issue,
it is not to be presumed that it was perverted to an improper purpose before the jury.
The last objection urged against the judgment is, that the damages assessed by the jury were excessive. The amount of the verdict
considerably exceeded the value of the animals actually proved,
though there was evidence which might have justified the jury in
somewhat exceeding that value. But it is plain that the jury gave
exemplary damages, in some amount; and the question is whether
the case justified a verdict of that character.
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The evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in believing that
the railroad track was in an improper condition, and unfit for the
exigencies which may often arise in running such dangerous engines;
being covered with grass, so as to prevent their prompt stoppage,
when necessary-that the cars were not supplied with the brakes
and fixtures necessary to their safe running and speedy stoppage;
and the injury here complained of is excused on these groundsthat the conductor was a lad of seventeen years of age, and giving
no attention to his duties when the collision took place; that the
engineer was a man of intemperate habits, reckless and unfit for the
responsible trust confided to him ; that either by his wanton conduct,
or by the improper manner in which the cars were furnished with
the necessary appliances for prompt stopping, (either or both of
which the jury had the right to believe from the evidence,) the
locomotive was not stopped, as it could and ought to have been on
a properly fitted and well-conducted railroad; that no proper exertion
was made to stop the locomotive in time to avoid the injury, and
that the engineer appeared reckless of the stock. No fault is
imputed to the plaintiff, except that he did not keep his stock from
the track, where they casually were without his knowledge.
Upon the evidence conducing to show this state of things, the
court, by the consent of both parties, instructed the jury as follows:
"Every man in the management of his own affairs, shall so conduct them as not to injure others; this duty was a mutual one,
binding alike on the plaintiff and defendants ; and if the plaintiff
has failed to observe this duty, and the defendants be guilty of a
like breach, the plaintiff has no right to complain, and cannot recover,
unlcss, notwithstanding the conduct of the plaintiff, the injury would
not have happened had it not been for the wanton and wilful negligence and misconduct of the defendants."
The question of gross negligence and wanton misconduct was
thus fully presented to the consideration of the jury.
Let us see what are the rules of law governing the conduct of the
defendants in the prosecution of their business.
In the first place, the company is responsible for the tortious acts of
its agent, whether the act was one of omission or commission, whether
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negligent, fraudulent, or deceitful. Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Co. vs. Derby, 14 How. 486. And the same doctrine is
held by the same court, in Stokee vs. Saltintall, 13 Peters, and is
applied to an incompetent or careless agent. Railroad Co. vs.
Keary, 3 Ohio, 206.
In the case first cited, the Supreme Court of the United States
say, in a case involving the liability of a railroad for an injury, by
the neglect of their agent: "Where carriers undertake to carry
persons by the powerful and dangerous agency of steam, public
policy and safety require that they be held to the greatest possible
care and diligence. And whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of the passengers should not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of
careless agents. Any negligence in such cases, may well deserve the
epithet of gross." 14 How. 486. And again: " N othing but the most
stringent enforcement of discipline, and the most exact and perfect
obedience to every rule and order emanating from a superior, can
insure safety to life and property. The entrusting such a powerful
and dangerous engine as a locomotive, to one who will not submit
to control and render implicit obedience to orders, is itself an act
of negligence, the 'causa causans' of the mischief. * * * *
Any relaxation of the stringent policy and principles of the law
affecting such cases, would be highly detrimental to the public
safety." lb. 487.
Again, it was the duty of the company to provide engines properly constructed and in good order, with suitable fixtures for preventing injuries likely to occur from the nature of their business;
and to use "such care and diligence in using their locomotive upon
the road as would be exercised by a skilful, prudent, and discreet
person, having a proper desire to- avoid injury to property along
the road ;" Baltimore and SusquehannaB. B. Co. vs. Woodruff,
4 Maryland, R. 257; to provide a safe track, a safe engine and
cars, and a suitable number of competent and faithful men to carry
on the work. Hegeman vs. Western B. B. Co., 16 Barb. 356; 2
Denio, 441; 3 Ohio R. 206; 2 Cushing, 540.
Again, it is a well settled rule of law and highly applicable to
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engines and locomotives on railroads, that persons having charge
of instruments of great danger, are bound to manage them with
the utmost care. Dixon vs. Bell, 5 . & S. 198; hyjnch vs. iYurdin,
I Q. B. 29; 41 E. C. L. l. It is well said by the Supreme Court
of Ohio, that "No one has the right to put in operation forces calculated to endanger life and property, without placing them under
the control of a competent and ever active superintending intelligence. Whether he undertakes it or procures another to represent
him, the obligation remains the same, and a failure to comply with
it in either case, imposes the duty of making reparation for any
injury that may ensue." 3 Ohio State R. 209.
And in this, as in all other cases of agency, the rule is, that
"the principal holds out his agent as competent and fit to be trusted,
and thereby he, in effect, warrants his fidelity and good conduct,
in all matters within the scope of the agency." Story on Agency,
452.
The question of gross negligence or wanton mischief was distinctly submitted to the jury, and was a material part of the case;
and whether we consider it with respect to the bad condition of the
track, and the absence of appliances and fence necessary for its safe
operation, or the unfitness and recklessness of the engineer, it is
plain that the jury were at liberty from the evidence, to find that
the injury was occasioned either by the gross neglect of the company, or the wanton mischief of the engineer. That was a question
which they had the right to determine, and their verdict cannot be
disturbed on that ground, when the evidence conduces to support it
in any fair view in which it can be taken, especially when the testimony is conflicting, and the credit of witnesses is involved.
Under such circumstances, their finding settles the fact. 14 How.
486 ; Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; 41 E. C. L. IL. ; Beers vs.
Hfousatonic R. B. Co., 19 Conn. 566. Lord Denman says, in
Lynch vs. Nurdin, "It is a matter strictly within the province of
a jury deciding on the circumstances of each case."
And it is immaterial whether the jury thought there was gross
neglect or willful mischief. The rules above stated apply equally
to either state of the case, and would warrant the jury in finding
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exemplary damages, if the circumstances of neglect or aggravation
tended to justify it, and they thought fit to award it. In the last
case cited, Lord Denman says, "Between willful mischief and gross
negligence the boundary line is hard to trace: I should rather say,
impossible. The law runs them into each other; considering such
a degree of negligence as some proof of malice." Lyneh vs. Nurdin.
And upon the same principle, the numerous cases, whether of gross
negligence or wanton wrong have proceeded, in which exemplary
damages have been awarded. For it matters but little to a party
injured, whether the wrong be done with a malicious intent, or by
gross violation or neglect of duty.
It must be taken, then, that the verdict of the jury settles the
question, that there were circumstances of aggravation tending to
show gross negligence, or a wanton and reckless disposition to
injure or destroy the plaintff's property. And it is well settled,
that if the property was destroyed under such circumstances, exemplary damages may be awarded. Sedgwick on Dam. 42 et se. ;
1b. 488, 489; 3 Graham & Wat. on New Trials, 1121 et seq., and
,cases there cited. And the damages allowed in this case do not
,ppear to be enormous.
Upon a careful consideration of the whole case, in view of its
great importance to the community, we are of opinion that the judgmient is correct; and it is accordingly affirmed.
A re-argument was asked on so much of the opinion as relates to
vindictive damages, but it was refused.
n the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, -February
11, 1858.
HOL ET.Svs. PAUL.

11. It.is
.no defence to a suit by a holder against the maker of a promissory note,
that the plaintiff is not the owner of the note and gave no value for it,
and that
.when he took it he knew that it was an accommodation note, and that defendant
had-received no value for it.
2. There is no difference between business paper and accommodation paper negotiated.
3. Apromissory note procured by an incorporated company for its accommodation
under the terms that the company would provide for its payment at maturity,
mr~y.lawfully be purchased or discounted by one who is a director of the company
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and a member of its finance committee, though he knew of these terms when he
took the note.
4. Such a person (unless he was the agent of the company for the sale of the note,)
takes a good title to it; and another person who is not the owner of the note, but
who received it without value from the owner, (viz: from the director, &c.,) may
maintain an action on it against the maker.

This was an action brought in the District Court for the city antl
county of Philadelphia by J. W. Paul against J. Holmes, on a
promissory note of the latter for $2,500, payable to his own order,
and by him endorsed. Affidavits of defence were filed; the material
facts stated in them were, that the real owner of the note on which
suit was brought was not James W. Paul, the plaintiff below, but
John Rodman Paul; and that plaintiff below took the same without
value or consideration; that both the Pauls knew at the time when
each took the note, the circumstances and terms on which it was
given by Holmes, viz: that it was an accommodation note given by
him to the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania, on the terms
that that company would provide for and pay the same when it
should fall due, and that Holmes would not be required to provide
for the payment of it. The affidavits further set forth that John
Rodman Paul, when he took it, was a Manager and one of the
Finance Committee of the Company.
The District Court entered a judgment, notwithstanding the affidavits of defence, and the case was taken by writ of error to the
Supreme Court.
On the part of the plaintiff in error, (defendant below,) it was
contended, 1st, that plaintiff below could not recover, because he was
not the owner of the note, and that he held without value, whilst
defendant below received no value, of which fact plaintiff below was
informed when he took the note; citing Mifflin vs. Roberts, 1 Esp.
261; RarrisburgBank vs. Mleyer, 6 S. & R. 537; Story on Prom.
Notes, § 190 ; Ohitty's Prac. 261, note i, 260, note g. 2d. That
J. Rodman Paul could not recover in this suit, though the real owner
of the note, but that his recourse must be to the Union Canal Company, for the accommodation of which company the note was given
and which was bound to provide for it at its matiurity, because when
he took the note he was a manager or director of that Company
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and a member of its finance committee; that in the absence of
proof to the contrary, the action of the Company in not providing
for the payment of the note at its maturity, is to be taken to have
been with the concurrence of J. R. Paul, who is also chargeable (in
common with the other managers and members of the committee)
-with having procured the note on the terms referred to, and he will
not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. His legal
position is the same as if the maker of the note had given it to a
mercantile firm for their accommodation, and a member of that firm
having full knowledge, had individually discounted the note. If
payment of the note at maturity should not be provided for by the
firm, tlie individual holder being a member of the firm, could not
recover against the maker, because it was by his default as 'well as
that of his co-partners that the note was not taken up by them. 1
Saunder's P1. and Ev. 587; Sparrow vs. Olisman, Chitty on Bills,
71, note q, &c.; Thompson vs. Clubley, 1 Mee. & W. 212.
That it is contrary to the policy of the law to permit an officer,
manager or agent of an incorporated company, and especially one
to whom its financial interests are entrusted, to buy, discount or
speculate in accommodation or other paper belonging to the company; because if permitted, there would be a temptation to such
official agents to keep the finances of the company embarrassed in
order that they might have an opportunity to make profit of its
necessities. That this temptation was particularly strong in the
case of the Union Canal Company because the lenders of money to
that Company were exempted by special enactment from the penalties prescribed for a violation of the usury laws, (Act of Assembly
14th April, 1846, § 2, P. L. 884; Act of 28th April, 1854, P. L.
511); Miohaud vs. @irod, 4 Howard, 558-5; Parsons on Mercantile Law, 167; Story on Agency, § 211, 212, &c.; Paley on
Agency, 38 to 86; Bartholomew vs..Leeck, 7 Watts, 472; Lazarus
vs. Bry en, 8 Binney, 54; Campbell vs. Penna. Life Insurance
Co., 2 Whart. 53-74.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Assuming the facts stated in the affidavit to be
proved, would they amount to a defence? It has been repeatedly
decided-by this court, and in two cases at this term, Dornanvs. The
THOMPSON,
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liners' Life Ins. Co., and .lloore vs. Baird, that there is no distinction between business paper and accommodation paper negotiated. The paper in suit was of the latter kind, and this is an
immaterial matter to a purchaser of it. That J. R. Paul was a
member of the ,Union Canal Co's Board of Directors was a fact
that did not lead him individually to perform their contracts as a
corporation, much less was he bound to know that the Company
would not fulfill their engagement in regard to the paper, if any
existed, as he became the purchaser of it before maturity, as stated
in the affidavit of defence, nor was there anything wrong, or in contravention of public policy or good faith in his purchasing, simply
because he was a member of the Board of Directors, or one of the
Finance Committee, as it is not alleged in the affidavit that he was
the agent of the Company to sell the note and then became the
purchaser of it. As we see no error in the judgment it must be
affirmed.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the -Distrietof
Maryland, April, 1858.
JOHN S. WRIGHT VS. THE SUN MUTUAL INSURANCE C01PANY OF NEW YORK.
SAM1E VS. THE ORIENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK.

1

1. Where an insurance company incorporated by the State of New York, having
their principal office in New York, and there executing policies of insurance
which were transmitted to agents in Baltimore who had authority to receive applications for policies and to receive and transmit notes for the premiums, and
through whom the company paid losses to parties in Baltimore, underwrote a
policy and sent it to parties residing at Baltimore, it was held that the contract
of insurance was a New York and not a Maryland contract.
2. Where the policy contained this clause, "to add an additional premium if by
vessels rating lower than A2," and the cargo was shipped in a schooner rating
lower than A2, and no fied sum as additional premium agreed upon, held that
the assured, in case of loss, could recover the value agreed in the policy, less
such additional premium beyond the agreed per cent. as in the opinion of the
underwriters might be deemed adequate for the increased risk of a cargo shipped
in a vessel rating below A2.
I We are indebted for this report to the Baltimore "Daily Emchange."-Es. A.

L. Beg.

WRIGHT vs. INSURANCE COMPAIES.

Coram GiLEs, J.
Attachment on policies of insurance, issued in the Superior Court
for the city of Baltimore, and removed into the Circuit Court of the
United States for this district, under the act of Congress.
These two cases were tried together, and were commenced on
Thursday, 16th April, and terminated on Wednesday, the 21st
April, by a verdict in each case for the plaintiff for the sum of
$17,365 13-under the direction and instruction of the court.
They were very fully and ably argued before the court on the
prayers of R. J. Brent for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Cutting
(of New York) and Nelson for the defendants. Judge Giles'
opinion fully reviewed all the facts in the case and the authorities cited by the counsel ; but as his opinion was not in writing,
we are only able to give our readers an abstract of the principal
points decided. The judge remarked in the commencement of his
opinion, that the principal point in these cases was one deeply interesting to the commercial community, among whom these running
policies were so frequently used. The defendants were insurance
companies incorporated by the State of New York, and their offices
were located in the city of New York. They had agents residing
in this city, who received and forwarded them all applications for
insurance; and received and transmitted to them the notes given
for the premiums from time to time, and through whom the said
defendants made payments for losses on policies held by parties
residing here. The policies on which these attachments were issued,
had been executed by the defendants in the city of New York, and
transmitted to their agents in this city, by whom they were delivered
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in both cases, had given to the said
agents his promissory notes for the premium mentioned in said
policies, and in the case of the Sun Mutual Ins. Co. the notes had
been paid by plaintiff; and in the case of the Orient Mutual .Tns.
Co. the money had been placed by him in the Union Bank of this
city, (where said notes were payable,) to meet them, but that company had so far, declined to receive it. The first question in these
cases is, are these policies of insurance to be considered as contracts
made in the city of New York, or as made in the city of Baltimore ?
For, when you have ascertained at which place the contract is to be
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considered as made, it is to be construed and interpreted by the law
and the usages of that place, except where a contract is made in
one place, and, by its terms, it is positively to be performed in
another. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that
these policies were to be considered as Maryland contracts, and to
be construed in reference to the usages and customs of underwriters
in this city. Now this became an important question in the cases,
because on the books of the insurance companies in New York, the
schooner "Mary W." (whose loss had given rise to this controversy)
was rated below A2, while on the books of underwriters and mercantile records in this city she was rated A2. The authorities
referred to by plaintiff's counsel did not, in the opinion of the court,
sustain the position he sought to maintain. In the case of the Bank
of Augusta vs. _Earles, &c., 13 Peters, 519, the principal point
decided was, that a bank chartered in Georgia could purchase a bill
of exchange in Mobile.
In the case of Cox & Dix vs. The United States, 4 Peters, 170,
the point decided was, that the official bond of the Navy Agent,
although signed at New Orleans, was for his faithfully accounting
at the proper department at Washington, and that therefore the
liabilities of the sureties were to be governed by the principles of
the common law, and not by the civil law of Louisiana. The casd
of Zachary & Turner vs. Boyle, in same volume, page 635, was
one of a payment made in Louisiana by plaintiffs for Boyle, and by
his sanction, to release his property there attached, and created a
debt due there, and was not released by the subsequent discharge of
Boyle under the insolvent laws of Maryland.
In the case of Hazard's Administrators vs. The New -England
Marine Ins. Co., 8 Peters, 557, the point decided was that the
letter, on application for insurance, written in New York, where
Hazard resided, although addressed to the defendants, a company
incorporated in Massachusetts, and having their office in Boston,
was to be tested as to the truth of its representations by the custom
as to the extent of coppering vessels in New York and not by the
custom in Boston. Judge Story in his great work on "The Conflict
of Laws," section 278, says: "A policy of insurance executed in
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England on a French ship for the French owner, on a voyage from
one French port to another, would be treated as an English contract,
and in case of loss, the debt would be treated as an English debt."
So in section 289, the same learned author says: "A merchant,
resident in Ireland, sends to England certain bills of exchange, with
blanks for the dates, the sums, the times of payment and the names
of the drawees. These bills are signed by the merchant in Ireland,
endorsed with his own name, and dated from a place in Ireland, and
are transmitted to a correspondent in England, with authority to
him to fill up the remaining parts of the instrument. The correspondent in England accordingly fills them up, dated at a place in
Ireland. Are the bills, when thus filled up and issued, to be deemed
English or Irish contracts ? It has been held, that under such circumstances, they are to be deemed Irish contracts, and of course to
be governed as to stamps and other legal requisitions by the law of
Ireland;" and analogous principles have been recognized in the
following cases: JWolsey vs. Bailey, 7 Foster, (N. H.) 217; Smith
vs. Smith, ibid. 244; -Davisvs. Coleman, 11 Iredell, 303. But
this very question has been settled in two cases by the Court of
Appeals of New York; and in one by the Superior Court in the
same State, in the cases of Hyde vs. Goodnow, 3 Comstock, 264;
•Western vs. The Genesee Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Keenan, 258; and
St. John vs. The American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Duer, 419.
In this last case the policy was issued from the office of an agency
of the company in New York, although the company was incorpo-rated in Connecticut; and it was held that the construction and
effect of this policy were to be governed by the law of Connecticut.
The case of Hyde vs. Goodnow was an action to recover the
amount of two premium notes given on a policy of insurance. A
mutual insurance company of New York had an agent residing in
Ohio, authorized to receive applications for insurance. This agent
received from a party residing in Ohio, the application with the
premium notes, and transmitted them to the office of the company
in New York, where they were received and approved, and where
the policy was executed and transmitted to the applicant by mail.
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It was held by the court that the contract was made in New York
at the office of the company, and not in Ohio.
In the case of Western vs. The Genesee .utual Ins. Co.-a
mutual insurance company incorporated and located in New Yorkhad an agent residing in Canada, who received the application for
insurance, and sent it to the company in New York, who there
signed the policy of insurance and forwarded it to their agent to be
delivered to the applicant-it was held to be a New York contract,
and its validity to depend upon the laws of that State.
The judge therefore held upon principle and upon authority that
the policies of insurance in these cases now being tried, were to be
considered New York contracts, and to be construed and interpreted as such, for by section 263 of" The Conflict of Laws," the rule
is laid down, "that the law of the place of the contract is to govern,
as to the nature, the obligation and the interpretation of the contract." In this case, therefore, as the evidence showed that the
schooner "Mary W." -was rated below A2, in New York, what is
the true construction of these policies, in that view, and assuming
that fact to be proved? These policies, although differing slightly
in phraseology, are substantially the same, and the court treated of
them together. Now, what are the principal provisions of the
" Sun" policy ? "The Sun Mutual Insurance Company do make
insurance, and cause Jno. S. Wright to be insured, lost or not lost,
at and from Rio de Janeiro to a port in the United States, one half
of 5,000 bags of coffee, laden, or to be laden, on board the good
vessel or vessels, &c. Beginning the adventure upon the said goods
from and immediately following the loading thereof on board the
said vessel, and shall so continue and endure until the goods shall
be safely landed at
, aforesaid. The said goods, hereby
insured, are valued at $18 per bag, as interest may appear," and
the policy admits "that the company have been paid for this insurance by the assured, at and after the rate of one and one-half per
cent. : To return one-quarter of one per cent. if direct to an Atlantic port. To add an additional premium if by vessels rating lower
than A2, or by foreign vessels: subject to such addition or deduction as shall make the premiums conform to the established rate at
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the time the return is made to the company." The words italicised
are in writing, and not printed, as are the other provisions of the
policy.
The other clauses of the policy are not material to this inquiry.
On the back of this policy there was this endorsement, made by the
defendant's agent in this city :-" 1856, August 27. Schooner
'Mary 7'.,' Bio de Janeiro to New Orleans, on half cargo, 1,830
bags coffee, valued at $18 per bag, not to attach if vessel be proved
unseaworthy."-$I 6,470. Now, the counsel for the defendants contended that this coffee never was covered by the said policy, because
it was loaded on board a vessel rating below A2, and the correspondence showed that no additional premium had been agreed upon
between the parties, and that, by the true construction of the policy,
the defendants had the right to fix the additional premium. Now,
-what are the rules for the construction of policies of insurance, as
recognized and acted upon by courts of justice ? The first one is
common to the construction of all contracts; that you must from
the written paper, ascertain, if possible, what was the true meaning
and understanding of the parties in the language they have used,
and to carry that into effect, if it violates no principle of law. The
second rule is, that policies of insurance are always to be construed
liberally, so as to insure the indemnity sought for, and that if there
be any ambiguity in the words of an exception, they are to be construed most strongly against the party for whose benefit they are
introduced. Another rule is, where the written and printed clauses
of a policy are in conflict, the written ones are to be sustained and
carried into effect. For these rules the court referred to the cases
of Palmer vs. Warren Ins. Co., I Story, 364; Yeaton vs. _yrey, 5
Cranch, 335 ; Grant vs. The -Lexington Ins. Co., 5 Indiana, (Porter) 23 ; Mobile Marine Dock and Ins. Co. vs. McMillan, 27 Alabaina, 77; Saylor vs. The Yorthwestern ins. Co., 2 Curtis, 610 ;
and Breasted and others vs. The Earmers' Loan and Trust Co., 2
Selden's Reports, 299..
This last case was peculiar. It was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, that in a life policy insurance, a provision "that
it should be void if the assured should die by his own hand" had
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reference to an act of criminal self-destruction, and not to one committed "while the party was insane." By these rules let this policy
be construed. And can it be successfully contended for one moment, that when the assured procured this policy, he had no intention of covering any of his coffee that might be sent to him in
vessels rating below A2, until he and the company should agree
upon the additional premium to be charged in such cases ? What
were the reasons for his procuring this policy, and paying the premium on so large amount in advance? Because he did not know
at what time and by what vessels his correspondents in Rio might
send him the 5,000 bags of coffee he had directed them to purchase
on his account, and he therefore wished his property to be thus
covered by insurance whenever it was afloat on the ocean, for it
might well be, that he might never hear of the shipment of his coffee
until its safe arrival or loss. This necessity of the mercantile world
has given rise to these running policies, which cover annually property to the value of millions of dollars. But if the view of these
insurance companies is to prevail, that the property is not covered
until the additional premium is fixed by them, or agreed upon
between the parties, then a very speedy termination would be put
to this kind of policy, and the defendants might as well close their
agencies in this city. But such the court held not to be the true
construction of this policy. The policy meant this, and nothing
more: that the defendants would insure the coffee of plaintiff, in its
transit from Rio to a port in the United States, at 1 per cent.
premium by whatever vessel carried, but if carried in a vessel rating
below A2, or by a foreign vessel, an additionalpremium should be
paid them. Additionalto what P Why, to the 13 per cent. already
paid, and such additional premium as, in the opinion of underwriters, would be equal to the increased risk to such a cargo in vessels
rating below A2, or in foreign vessels. And this seems to have
been the view taken by the Sun Mutual Insurance Company itself
in its correspondence with its agent in this city ; for although, in
their letter of August 25th, 1856, they take the ground "that the
assured had no right to have this risk on the Mary W. covered on
this policy," they subsequently recede from this position, and in
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their letter of the 80th August, "t h ey admit he had the right, but
that the fixing of the premium rested solely with them." The court
thought the latter position as untenable as the former. As something had been said in the course of the argument, in reference to
the endorsement on the policy of the 27th August, the court
remarked that they considered this endorsement fully warranted by
the defendants' letter to their agent, of that date ; and that, indeed,
the agent, with that letter in his hand, could have made no other
endorsement. The plaintiff presented the two prayers, and the
defendants presented three prayers. The court remarked that they
agreed with the propositions of law contained in defendants' 1st and
2d prayers, and plaintiff's second prayer, and only rejected them
because they were substantially embraced in the instruction which
the court would give to the jury, but they rejected the plaintiff's
1st prayer and the defendants' 3d prayer as in conflict with tleir
view of the law of the case; and the court then gave to the jury the
following instruction:
"If the jury shall find from the evidence, that the defendants
executed the policy of the 27th July, 1855, and received from the
plaintiff the premium therein mentioned; and that their duly authorized agent in this city made the endorsements on the said policy,
which have been offered in evidence, and shall further find that
1,830 bags of coffee, belonging to plaintiff, were shipped on the
12th of July, 1856, at Rio, on board the schooner Mary W., to be
carried to New Orleans, and that when said schooner left Rio she
was seaworthy and in good condition; and shall further find, that the
said vessel and cargo were subsequently on said voyage totally lost by
one of the perils insured against; and that said schooner was rated
lower in New York than A2, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover
for one half the value of said coffee so lost, at $18 per bag, less such
additional premium beyond the 13- per cent., as in the opinion of
the underwriters may be deemed adequate for the increased risk to
a cargo of coffee shipped in a vessel rating below A2, with interest
from thirty days after such time as the jury may find the defendants were furnished by plaintiff with the preliminary proofs of his
said loss; and there is no evidence in this case that the said schooner
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at any period during the running of this policy rated as high
as A2 in any of the insurance offices in New York."
Hon. Henry May, Bobert J. Brent and Vivian Brent, Esqrs.,
for the plaintiff.
Hon. John Nelson and Messrs. Brown & Brune, of Baltimore,
and Hion. F. B. Cutting and Alexander H7amilton, Jr., Esq., of
New York, for the defendants.

In the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
EDWIN

LUDLOW vs. EDWARD HURD ET AL.

1. Under the Ohio statute regulating railroads, a chartered railroad corporation is

fully authorized to execute a mortgage as security for money borrowed upon
bond.
2. Where the mortgage described the property as "the right of way and land occupied thereby, together with &c.," enumerating every kind of property attached to
and used by a railroad, and added "1and other property then owned by or there-

after to be acquired and owned by the said company," it was held, that in equity,
furniture contained in the company's business office, if necessary for the operation
of the road, was within the language of the mortgage, and that an execution

levied on it must be postponed to the lien of the mortgagee.
8. Although at common law an assignment will not convey a chattel unless it is in
esse at the time of the transfer, it is otherwise in equity.
4. It is settled at common law, that a franchise is not subject to levy on execution;
it can only be reached in Chancery.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The plaintiff claims that he is the mortgagee, in
trust, for certain holders of bonds issued by the Cincinnati and
Marietta Railroad Company. "The conveyance is in due form,
properly executed and recorded in the Recorder's office of Hamilton
county, dated March 1, 1857, to secure the payment of fifteen hundred bonds for $1,000 each, which are to become due on the 1st
of September, 1880, with seven per cent. interest, payable semiannually. The property described in the deeds is "the right of
way and the land occupied thereby, together with the superstructure
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and the track thereon, and all bridges, &c., depot grounds and buildings thereon, and all other appurtenances belonging thereto, and all
franchises, rights and privileges of the Company, in and to the
same; also, all locomotives, tenders, cars, machinery, tools, implements, fixtures, wood, fuel, oil, waste and other property then owned
by, or thereafter to be acquired and owned by said Company, for
the purpose of using or repairing said cars, or any other of the
property of the Company with power on the part of the Company
to dispose of any of the property not necessary to be retained for its
roadway, depot grounds or stations, not required for the construction or convenient use of the road."
That five hundred of the bonds described in the instrument of
the mortgage have been negotiated by the Company, and are a subsisting charge upon the property mortgaged.
That the defendant Hurd, having recovered a judgment for
$275 33 against the company, before competent authority, has
caused execution to be issued, and levied upon "the furniture contained in five several rooms of the Company's business office in Cincinnati, situated on Third street," which is particularly described
in the complainant's petition; also the furniture contained in another
business office of the company in Cincinnati, in one of the rooms of
the Burnet House. It is alleged that the property is advertised for
sale by the officer who levied the execution, and -will be sold unless
this court interfere; that the above offices " are attached, belong to,
and form a part of the railroad and its appurtenances, and were established and fitted up and furnished by the company for the purpose
of transacting and carrying on their business on the said road, they
being necessary therefor, and are now used for that purpose; that the
same are indispensable to the full enjoyment of the use of the road,
and are a part and parcel of the property conveyed to the plaintiff
by the deed oif the company." It is further stated that the sale of
the property would produce great injury to the plaintiff and the
bondholders, by depriving the company of the use of the same,
thereby also lessening the business and earnings of the company, and
thus preventing the payment of the interest and principal of the
bonds, which business and earnings are not now more than sufficient
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to pay said interest. It is further stated that the property levied
on was acquired by the company subsequent to the execution of the
mortgage.
To this petition the defendant, Hurd has demurred.
Two questions are presented upon the pleadingsFirst, The authority of the railroad company to borrow money,
and mortgage their property to secure it.
Second, What property passed by the conveyance to Ludlow?
The thirteenth section of the law of February 11, 1848, "regulating railroad companies," gives express power to every such corporation "to borrow money, not exceeding its authorized capital
stock,' at a rate of interest not exceeding seven per cent. per annum,
and execute bonds or promissory notes therefor, and, to secure the
payment thereof, may pledge the property and income of such company."
This provision, so fully conferring a right to borrow money, to
issue bonds, and secure their payment by a mortgage upon the property and income of the company, dispenses with the necessity of
discussing the question of corporate power, upon general principles.
However doubtful it may have been regarded by courts of high
authority, we are saved the labor of examining conflicting opinions,
as well as the effort to reconcile them.
We must h6ld the company was fully authorized to execute the
mortgage referred to in the petition.
The second question involves the inquiry: "What property
passed by the description in the deed ?"
In ordinary cases this is to be determined by the intention of the
parties, a indicated by their contract; and where, after a general
grant of the principal thing, its incidents or appurtenances, are not
expressly reserved or excluded, the transfer will be held to cover
the subject specifically granted, and all that is connected with it,
as naturally dependent upon it, or that may be properly regarded
as essential to its full enjoyment.
This is the rule affirmed in Whitler's case, 10 Co. 64 and 65,
which is followed in all the modern cases, as in 6 Greenleaf, 436,
Blake vs. Olark; 1 Sumner, 492, United States vs. Appleton;
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11 Conn. 525, Parsons vs. Camp; 18 Wendell, 157, Van WTyck
vs. Wright; and in 20 Ohio, 401, Morgan vs. Mason, where it is
said : " Whatever is actually enjoyed with the thing granted as a
beneficial privilege at the time of the grant, passes as parcel of it.
Therefore, everything belonging to the estate conveyed, as an incident or appurtenance, passes by the grant, and to this end the law
gives, in all cases, a reasonable intendment to the grant."
The principle thus established is of universal application in the
transfer of real property; and though its origin dates back to a very
remote period, when the alienation of land was guarded with great
jealousy, and then necessarily confined to a class of estates to which
but few, if any of the appurtenances of modern times were incident,
its application is none the less just or equitable.
The improvements in mechanics have introduced new modes by
which the business of the world is not only performed, in its various
departments, but essentially controlled in its results. Hence, the
adaptation of steam power to locomotion includes not only the
enjoyment of rights of way, but the construction of road beds, and
the consequent use of the various materials necessary to their fabric;
the ownership, also, of engines, with their various appendages, rail
cars, baggage and freight cars, are alike indispensable. It is
equally necessary, to the full enjoyment of the franchise conferred
upon a railroad company, that the corporation should hold depots
and depot grounds, machine shops, and other establishments for the
manufacturing, as well as the repair of their engines and cars. The
same power must be given, either expressly or by necessary implication, to own or rent suitable buildings to accommodate their different employees in the transaction of their daily duties, as bookkeepers, clerks, and cashiers, as well as furnishing a proper place
for the directors to hold their meetings.
It must follow, from the power thus given, that the company
may provide furniture proper for their different offices, and which
may well be included in, and pass by the name of corporate property, and which, though practically separate from, and forming no
immediate part of the railroad, its appurtenances, franchises, or
machinery, are still so closely connected with the proper manage-

LUDLOW vs. HURD ET AL.

ment of the road, and the interest of the stockholders, as well as the
creditors, that they cannot be dispensed with and the purposes of
the railroad be accomplished.
A corporate body whose daily business is the transportation of
passengers and freight, in whose capital stock large amounts are
invested by every class, should be held to the strictest accuracy in
their accounts. Their receipts and expenditures can only be known
when this duty is fulfilled to the letter; hence, the power to employ
the most competent clerks, and the duty to provide all the necessary accommodations to enable them to have an intelligent and
careful supervision of the various transactions of every day. On
no other theory can frauds be prevented, or, if committed, detected.
It is very clear, then, we must regard as appurtenant to, and
necessary for the working of a railroad, that all the species of
property to which we have referred, should become a part of the
road itself; essential, indeed, to its use, and, if denied, destructive to
the purpose for which it was built.
There may be, unless we carefully look at the relations the several
departments of a railroad bear to each other, no clear apprehension
of their real identity, when the rights of the corporation are questioned. We may separate the appurtenance from the subject when
real estate is conveyed, and there yet be a thing to be enjoyed,
while its measure or extent only is impaired or restricted; but, in a
case like that before us, if one of the incidents essential, to the
successful operation of the road is withheld, the consequence may
be irreparable injury to all concerned in the prosperity.of the
enterprise.
It was, without doubt, the intention of the company to pledge their
whole available property, all they could legally call their own, of
which they were then possessed, or might afterwards lawfully acquire,
for the security of the bondholders, on the terms stated in the deed of
trust; and if they could not, as a corporate body, be the owners of
any other property than that connected with, incident to, or necessarily attached to the proper operation of the road, it would seem
to follow that every portion of it they might lawfully possess, they
might lawfully pledge.
32

LUDLOW vs. HURD ET AL.

At common law, it is said an assignment -will not convey title to
chattels, except those "in esse" at the time of the transfer. This
doctrine had its origin, we are told, in the determination, on the part
of the courts, at an early period, " to prevent maintenance and the
multiplication of contentions and suits, so that no possibility, right,
title, or any other thing, not in possession, could be granted or
assigned to strangers ;" and so strictly was it applied, that a grant
of land, where the vendor was out of the possession, was void. Co.
Litt. 265, a. n. 1., 2fogg vs. Baker, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 197; Robinson et al. vs. Sharp, 5 Maule & Sel. 228; Gale vs. Burnel, 7 Adol.
& Ellis, 850.
The English courts still adhere, as it will be seen in the cases
already cited, with many qualifications, to the ancient maxim, and
have been followed by American judges, who, while they admit the
power of precedent, and feel bound to follow what is believed to be
established, nevertheless interpose very significant exceptions to its
full application.
Thus, in Tappfield vs. ifellman, et al., 6 Man. & Grang. 247,
Chief Justice Tindal said: " It would have been very easy to
have so framed the power of entry as to make it extended to all
effects found on the premises at the time the power should be
enforced ; and Coltman and Maule, justices, clearly admit that, as
between the parties, there may be a valid transfer of such property.
In 10 Metcalf, 481, Jones vs. Richardson; and in 13 id. 29, Hoody
vs. Wright, it is said that "1one cannot mortgage property of which
he is not possessed, and to which he has no title at the time; and
this doctrine is affirmed in 2 Cushing, 294, Bernard vs. -Eaton,and
in 3 id. 806, Codman vs. Preeman; so in 8 Gilman, 455, .Rhines
vs. Phelps, et al. ; 14 Conn. 581, Griswold vs. Sheldon.
But in the latter case, as well as in 7 Shepley, 408, Abbot vs.
Gordon, it was admitted that a mortgage lien will cover chattels
purchased after the deed is executed, with the proceeds of those
actually mortgaged; and where there was a right to sell reserved to
the mortgagor, it must have been the intention of the parties that
the proceeds of all property sold should be subjected; and this is
the principle upon which the cases, also, of Jenkes' Adm'r vs.
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aoffe, 1 R. Island, 511, and Southwell vs. Ishan, 4 Sandford, 449,
were decided.
How far, upon these adjudications, the rights of intermediate
creditors, or mortgagees, are affected at law, is matter of grave consideration. We suppose the better rule to adopt is, that which prevails where a mortgage is given to secure subsequent advances.
In such cases our own courts have decided that the security cannot
be extended to exclude the property from the levy, or seizure of
an intervening creditor. 15 Ohio, 258, 260, Kramer vs. P. and
Hf. Bank; 17 Ohio, 391, Spader vs. Lawler; 6 Conn. 37, Shepherd
vs. Shepherd.
We have remarked that, at law, the principle to which we have
referred seems to be mainly applied. In equity, it is greatly mitigated if not for many purposes denied.
Lord Eldon In re Ship Warre, 8 Price, 269, decided that the
future earnings of a ship would pass, though the transfer of the
vessel was made while she was at sea. "I take it to be clear,"
says he, "that if there be an assignment made of the earnings and
freight of an existing voyage, it is valid; and if that be so of a
voyage in esse, why not one in immediate posse ?"
So, in Wellesley vs. Wellesley, 4 Myl. & Cr. 560, Lord Cottenham held "that a covenant to secure an annuity, by a charge upon
freehold estates, or by an investment in the funds, or by the best
means in his power, will create a lien upon any property to which
the covenantor becomes entitled, between the date of the covenant
and the time for its performance ;" and, again, in 6 Simons, 224,
Metealfe vs. The Archbishop of York, the same Chancellor said:
"There can be no doubt that a covenant to charge, or dispose of,
or affect lands hereafter to be -acquired, operates, in equity, upon
lands so afterward acquired, against the party creating the charge."
The question is very ably discussed in Langton vs. Horton, 1
Hare, 556, and the same conclusion adopted. It was here decided
"that the mortgage of a ship, then on a whaling voyage, with all
cargo which might be caught and brought home in the vessel, was,
as against the assignor, a valid assignment in equity, as well of the
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future cargo to be taken during the particular voyage, as of that, if
any, which existed at the time of the assignment."
If we regard this equitable doctrine in the case before us, we
may very readily conclude that, by its proper application, we shall
subserve the purposes of justice, and carry out the intentions of the
parties to the contract.
Where a railroad company is authorized by law to mortgage its
whole corporate property, which includes not 'merely its road bed,
and the structures connected with it, but all its rights and franchises in addition, a conveyance, by such terms, must comprehend
the power to reconstruct or repair the road, by all the means necessary to accomplish the purpose. Whatever is added to the original
structure becomes a part of it, and cannot be severed from it; and
if the security by the mortgage is to continue to be of any value
during the period that must transpire before the bonds become due,
it must depend upon the implied covenant of the company to keep
it in running order, and thus earn the necessary sums to discharge
the accruing interest, and eventually indemnify the creditors for the
principal debt.
By the transfer to the plaintiff, we must hold, then, that a paramount right to all additions made to the railroad subsequent to the
date of the deed was vested; that the plaintiff could at any time,
when interest was unpaid, take possession of the subject, which will
include every species of property then owned by the company, as
attached to or incident to the road itself. If the right to the possession exists, then the right to protect the property from sale
necessarily follows; and the plaintiff may ask us to aid him by injunction. The question in such a case is, "Who has the better
right, in equity, to call for the legal estate, or the legal possession ?'
And if the equitable owner of the incumbrance has done enough to
perfect his equitable title, he has the better right. Langton vs.
Horton, 1 Hare, 560, 562; Newland vs. Paynter,4 Myl. & Cr. 408.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in 82 N. H. 484, -Pierce
-vs. -mery, have decided the direct question before us, though the
case is somewhat involved. In New Jersey, 3 Green Chy. 877,
Willick-vs. Morris Canal and Banking Companj, it was held that
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a transfer of the canal property carried with it all subsequent additions to the subject.
In the late case of -Pillipset al. vs. Winston, not yet reported,
but of the opinion in which a copy has been furnished to us, the
Court of Errors of Kentucky have adopted the same rule, and
decreed a perpetual injunction against the intervening creditor, who
bad levied upon property acquired by the company subsequent to
their mortgage; and a similar construction is given by Judge
McLean, in the case of Coe, Trustee, vs. Pennock and others, decided at the July term of the Circuit Court for this District, reported
in 6 Am. Law Register, p. 27.
We have been referred to a clause in the deed of trust which
authorizes the mortgagors to dispose of any part of the property
that may not be necessary to the use of the road; and it is urged
upon us that this power thus reserved is inconsistent with the estate
granted by the deed itself, and must, therefore, defeat it.
It may, in many cases, be a very suspicious circumstance, when
such a permission is given by the mortgagee; as, for instance,
where a stock of goods, or articles of ordinary consumption are
pledged absolutely, and the title is consequently vested in the mortgagee, the liberty reserved to the mortgagor to sell might well furnish,
if unexplained, an implication of fraud in the contract; but where,
from the nature of the property pledged, it is indipensable that
many portions of it should, from time to time, be repaired, reconstructed or renewed, there can be no impropriety in permitting the
party who is bound to keep up the road, and to provide all things
necessary to its use, to dispose of the old material, either in part
payment of new appliances, or for its general preservation.
By this permission no one cati be defrauded, and no rule of law
is violated. The recording of the mortgage advises the public that
the company have pledged their property, and it seems to us that
the license to sell it, as limited in the deed, confers no greater right
than the mortgagors would have had if no such clause were inserted.
A broken locomotive, a worn out rail, the timber necessary to
repair the road-bed, require to be protected from injury, and made
available for the purposes of the pledge; hence the mortgagor may
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well be the agent of the parties interested in the security, to see
that their property, however useless, is not totally lost, and a power
to sell, if necessary to effect that object, might be inferred from the
relation of the parties to each other.
The question how far the property and franchise of a railroad
company, or any similar corporate body, may be subject to sale by
execution, has been frequently discussed and determined of late
years, both in England and the United States. It is settled, we
suppose, definitely, that the franchise, which includes the right of
toll, cannot be levied on and sold, unless the Legislature who
granted it assent to the transfer. This was decided in The State
vs. Bives, 5 Iredell, 267.
It is the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Ammant vs. The New Alexandria and -PittsburgTurnpike Boad,
18 Serg. & Rawle, 212; in Seeden vs. Plymouth B. B. Co., 5
Watts & Serg. 266; and in Susquehanna Canal Co. vs. Bonham,
9 id. 27 ; in Massachusetts, in Tippetts vs. Walker, 4 Mass. 596;
in Kentucky, in Winchester and Lexington Turnpike Co. vs. Yimont, 5 B..Monroe, 1.
In Ohio the point was fully examined and decided in Seymour
vs. M.ilf. and Chillicothe Turnpike Co., 10 Ohio, 476.
The result is very clearly stated in the very accurate and learned
treatise on the Law of Sheriffs and Coroners, by Mr. Gwynne, page
341. "The right of taking toll is a franchise, and is not, at common law, nor by the statute of Ohio regulating judgment and executions, subject to levy on execution; it may be reached in chancery."
And the rule thus established is not confined to the franchise
merely; it covers every case where it is attempted to separate the
structure of a railway or turnpike road, in parts, by a seizure on
execution. The whole work is regarded as an entire thing, and
each portion so dependent upon every other that the integrity of
the fabric, from its commencement to its terminus, will be preserved.
Thus it is said, in 13 Serg. & Rawle, 212, already cited, "The
inconvenience would be excessive if the right of the company could
be cut up into an indefinite number of small parts, and vested in
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individuals." Such a course would defeat the object of the incorporation, both as respects the stockholders, and the public, also,
who have at last a very material interest in the preservation of
every important thoroughfare, as they derive daily benefit from its
use. We must regard, then, not among the least of the considerations which very properly press upon us in examining a question
like this, the public right and the public advantage. So long as a
highway similar to the present can be kept up, it is required by the
public interest that it should be. When, however, the corporate
body becomes so involved in debt that it cannot longer fulfill the
object for which it was created, a court of equity should interfere,
take possession of the whole property and wind up the concern.
This is not only the course indicated in kindred cases, but it is
peculiarly fit where creditors and debtors, with their varied interests
in a common fund, are to be protected by an equal division of the
assets, according to the priority of their liens.
We have referred to this view of the case to illustrate more fully
the rule we should adopt in examining the questions submitted by
the pleadings.
We cannot now determine whether the property levied on is
essential to the business of the company, upon the principles we have
laid down. It may be that there has been extravagant expenditures in the furnishing of the apartments occupied as offices; it may
be that economy has been ignored, and the fashion of the day, in
the outlay of money, has been adopted; it may be that the old rule,
" sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcedas," has been forgotten; and it is
our duty, if either the one or the other of these conditions exist, to
see that the evil, for it is one, is corrected.
No company has the right to'permit its agents to pervert the corporate funds from their legitimate purpose, by providing unnecessary or costly offices, or office furniture for their subordinates. Such
an assumption is equally improper, as would be the lavish expenditure of their income in the payment of salaries disproportionate to
the labor performed, or distributing it among an army of attachees
and dependents, who may be all the while consuming the substance of
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the corporation at the expense of those who have paid up their stock
or loaned money upon their bonds.
There must be a reference to a master to examine the property
levied on, and report, immediately, whether the same, on the principle indicated by the court, is necessary to the operation of the road;
and if any part thereof can be disposed of without injury to the
company, to describe it.
Until the coming in of the report no further order will be made.
Taft & Perry, for plaintiff.
_Kittridge, for defendants.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, 2laesachusetts -District,
May Term, 1857.
THE SALMON FALLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY VS. THE BARK TANGIER.'
1. To constitute a delivery by the master, of goods brought in a vessel from a port
in another State to the port of Boston, under the ordinary bill of lading, mere
unlivery of the goods and landing them on the wharf is not sufficient; there must
also be reasonable notice to the consignee, allowing him time to make the usual
and necessary preparations to receive the goods. And it is no delivery to unlade
the goods at an unusual time. Thus, where, by the usage of a port, consignees
are not in the habit of receiving goods on the day of the annual fast, a notice by
the master to the consignee that he shall unload the goods on that day, will not
bind the consignee to receive them; and where goods were so unladen, and not
accepted or received by the consignee, and were, on the same day, destroyed by
fire on the wharf: Held, that the loss must fall upon the carrier.
2. Fire, occurring on the wharf, after goods are landed, is not within the exception
of damages of the seas, in the ordinary bill of lading.
3. Nor is such a fire within the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, relieving ship
owners from liability for damage by fire to goods on board of vessels, in certain
cases.

The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion by
J.-This is an appeal from a decree of the District
Court, in a suit in rem founded on a bill of lading in the usual form,
CURTIS,
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signed by the master of the Tangier, at Apalachicola, on the 3d
day of March, 1856, for one hundred bales of cotton, to be delivered
at the port of Boston, (the dangers of the seas only excepted,) unto
John Aiken, the Treasurer of the Salmon Falls Company, to which
corporation the cotton belonged.
The District Court decreed in favor of the claimants, and the
libellants appealed.
The material facts, which are not in dispute, are, that the bark
arrived in the port of Boston on Sunday, the 6th day of April,
1856. On Monday, at the request of Goddard & Pritchard, who
were the consignees of the larger part of the cargo, the bark was
hauled to Lewis Wharf, and the unlading was begun. At some
time between the hours of ten, A. M., and three, P. Ml., notice was
given to Aiken's clerk, at his counting room, that the Tangier had
hauled to the north side of Lewis Wharf, and had commenced discharging. The work of discharging was begun between two and
three o'clock, P. M., and continued about two hours. On Tuesday,
it was further continued until one o'clock, P. M., when it ceased,
because there was not room on the wharf to receive more cargo.
It was not resumed on Wednesday for the same reason. On Thursday, which was the day fixed by the proclamation of the Governor
of Massachusetts for the annual Fast-day, the work was resumed
at seven o'clock, A. M., and prosecuted till one o'clock; at which
time the cotton belonging to the different consignees was all out of
the vessel,.and such of it as had not previously been removed by
the consignees, had been separated into lots, according to the
various marks, and was ready for delivery. Immediately afterwards, an accidental fire broke out on the wharf, and the cotton
was burned. Pursuant to the notice received by the libellants on
Monday afternoon, they sent men and teams to the wharf on Tuesday morning, and by one o'clock had removed thirty-five bales,
which was all that could be found on the wharf belonging to the
libellants. On Wednesday morning, the same men and teams were
again sent to the wharf, but only one bale of the libellant's cotton
could then be found, and the person in charge of the teams was
informed by the mate of the bark that no cotton had been discharged
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since one o'clock, the previous day, for want of room on the wharf,
and he did not know when they should recommence discharging.
So that, down to Thursday, there was no want of diligence on the
part of the libellants, in acting on the notice given them, and being
in readiness to receive all that was in readiness to be delivered.
Sixty-five of their bales of cotton were burned, and the question
is, whether it was at their risk, or that of the bark, at the time of
the fire.
The bill of lading in this case imports an obligation to carry and
to deliver the goods, qualified only by the exception of danger of
the seas. Fire, occurring on the wharf, after the goods are landed,
is not within the exception. Oliver vs. The Memphis Ins. Co. 19
How. 312; Airey vs. Merrill, 2 Curtis's 0. 0. R. 8.
So that, for the purposes of this case, there was one entire and
absolute contract to carry and deliver; and the question is whether
it had been performed when the goods were destroyed.
Actual delivery can be made by a carrier only to the consignee,
or some one representing him, and who assents to and does receive
the goods. But, inasmuch as the liability of the carrier, as such,
cannot be protracted by the neglect or refusal of the consignee to
receive the goods, an offer to deliver them at such a time and place,
and in such a manner, as is required by the contract, accompanied
by a present ability so to deliver them, is so far equivalent to an
actual delivery, that it terminates the liability of the carrier, as
carrier, though a duty of custody and care may, under some circumstances, then arise.
The questions, at what time and place, and in what manner, the
delivery may be offered, and how the offer may be made, depend
on the usage of the business in which the particular transaction
occurs. Stated generally, it may be said to be the usage of the
business in which this transaction occurred, for the vessel to be
placed at some suitable wharf, and notice given to the consignees of
the cargo, of the place where the vessel lies, and that the cargo is
about to be discharged. It is then landed and made ready for delivery. The consignees, after receiving such notice, are expected
to take notice of the fact that their consignments are made ready
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for delivery; and as soon as they are so, they are, in judgment of
law, delivered, and the carrier's peculiar liability is ended.
Such is the usage in point of fact, and like many other settled
usages of commerce, it is recognized by the law, and has become a
rule which courts of justice take notice of and enforce. But this
rule has several important qualifications. In the first place, it is
necessary that the notice to the consignee should be a reasonable
notice. By which I understand that it must not so long precede
the readiness to deliver, as to impose on the consignee an unusual
and unnecessary burden of keeping in readiness to receive and
transport his goods ; nor, on the other hand, that it should fail to
allow the consignee reasonably sufficient time to make usual and
necessary preparations to receive and transport them. In the next
place, the goods must not only be placed on the wharf-they must
'be made ready for delivery.
The mere discharge of a cargo is not equivalent to a delivery of
the cargo. On the contrary, important rights and interests, both
of the ship-owner and the consignees of the cargo, depend upon the
preservation of the distinction between unlading and delivery.
This is well illustrated by the case of Certain Logs of Mahogany,
reported in 2 Sumner, 589. In that case, the cargo was libelled
for freight due under a charter-party, which made the freight payable "in five days after the brig's return to and dischargein Boston."
It was insisted that this displaced the lien; because it showed that
a credit was to be given after the cargo should be delivered. Air.
Justice Story held otherwise. He considered that not only were discharge and delivery distinct from each other, but that the consignee
had a right to have his goods landed, and so placed that he could ascertain their condition before he made himself liable for the freight; and
that the master had the right to unliver the cargo, and still retain
it in his own possession, until the freight should be paid. Such is
the maritime law of England and France, as well as of this country.
See also Ostrander vs. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; where it is expressly
laid down that landing on a wharf is not delivery.
If we consider the grounds upon which the law terminates the
liability of the carrier without an actual delivery, it will be apparent
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that mere unlivery is not sufficient. Those grounds are, readiness
to deliver, accompanied by such an offer to deliver as the consignee
is bound to act upon. If the carrier is not ready to deliver, it is of
no importance from what cause such want of readiness proceeds.
Whether it be because the goods are still in the vessel, or because
they are so mixed with others on the wharf that they are not accessible, or because the master intends to insist on his lien for freight,
or for an average bond, is immaterial.
If he is not ready to deliver, the law does not deem the delivery
made, and he must be ready to deliver at such a time as the consignee is bound to receive his goodg. The law does not allow the
carrier's liability to be protracted by the neglect or refusal of the
consignee to receive his goods. But until there is some neglect, the
principle does not apply. All -will agree that if the master be ready
to deliver on Sunday, or in the night time, such readiness cannot
avail; for there is no duty incumbent on the consignee to receive
goods at such times, and consequently no neglect on his part.
These principles, when applied to the facts shown in evidence,
are sufficient to determine this case.
The sixty-five bales of cotton belonging to the libellants, which
were destroyed, were made ready for delivery on Thursday, the
tenth of April. That was the day of the annual Fast. The evidence
is decisive that it was not usual for consignees to receive goods on
that day. A large number of merchants, custom-house officers,
wharfingers, and port-wardens, have been examined; their testimony
covers a period of more than twenty years, and embraces an ample
amount of knowledge of the business in which this transaction
occurred. And it clearly shows that the annual Fast, during the
entire period, has been a day when merchants do not receive consignments of goods.
It is also proved that in frequent instances, when the discharge
of a vessel has been left incomplete, it has been completed on the
Fast-day; though this practice seems to be limited to goods not
perishable; and the reason assigned for not landing perishable goods
on that day is, that consignees do not take away their goods on that
day.
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There is no inconsistency in these courses of business, nor any
conflict of rights growing out of them. The time when the cargo
is discharged is at the will of the master. He may unlade it and
make it ready for delivery on the Fourth of July, or in the nighttime, if he chooses so to do. And he may unlade it -without notice
to the consignee. But such an unlading and preparation to deliver,
are not equivalent to a delivery, because there is not such reasonable
opportunity for the consignee to receive his goods, and such neglect
of that opportunity, as the law puts in place of an actual delivery.
The practice to complete the discharge of vessels on the Fast-day,
may satisfactorily show that it is a reasonable and proper act. It
may justify the master as between him and the owners of the vessel.
And so, many emergencies might justify him in discharging in the
night-time, or even on Sunday. In the absence of all other evidence,
proof of a usage to complete discharge on the Fast-day, might also
be sufficient to show that it was a usual and reasonable time to make
delivery; because the reception of goods usually takes place on the
day when they are discharged. But the proof is direct and clear
that the Fast-day is not a usual time for the delivery of the goods.
Taking the entire evidence into view, it comes to this: The
master, may, if he please, discharge on the Fast-day; but he does
so with the knowledge that there will be no delivery of them till the
next day; because a discharge and readiness to deliver are not a
delivery, and do not become so, until some usual time arrives for
the consignee to attend for the purpose of receiving his goods.
It was strongly urged that the observance of the Fast-day is
purely voluntary; that there is no legal obligation to observe it;
and that to deprive the master of the power to offer a delivery on
that day, would compel him to bbserve the day, and thus trench on
his legal right to work on that day, if he choose to do so. But the
same argument would apply to the Fourth of July, which I believe
is universally kept as a holiday. And the answer to it in that case,
as well as in the case at bar would be, that all who engage in a
particular business must conform to the reasonable and lawful usages
of that business; that what is usual in respect to times and places
and modes of doing business, in the absence of any rule of law to
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the contrary, becomes a rule which all concerned are understood to
assent to when they engage in that business; and that, for a master
to insist that a consignee should not observe a particular day, usually
observed by consignees, would deprive the consignee of a right of
choice, secured to him by the usage, and by the implied consent of
the master himself.
After the fullest consideration, I am of opinion that these goods
were destroyed before the time had arrived for the consignee to
receive them ; that consequently there was no delivery in point of
law, and the vessel is liable for their value, unless relieved by the
first section of the act of Congress, of March 3rd, 1851, 9 Statutes at
Large, 635.
This section is copied from the second section of the Act of 26
Geo. 3, c. 86, which received a judicial interpretation by the Court
of Queen's Bench, in Morewood vs. Pollok, 18 Eng. Law & Eq.
341. It was there held that the Act did not extend to the case of
a fire occurring on board a lighter, in which cotton was being conveyed from the vessel to the shore. This decision is in conformity
with the language of the act, which limits its operation to fire happening to or on board of the vessel. Without a departure from the
plain meaning of the words of the act, I cannot extend it to a fire
happening on shore.
The result is, that the decree of the District Court must be reversed,
and a decree entered in favor of the libellants for the value of the
cotton, and costs.

JUSTI PON AND OTHERS vs. BRIG ARBUSTCL

In the United States District Court, Southern Di-strict of New
York, December, 1857.
JUSTI PON AND

OTHERS vs. THE PROCEEDS OF THE BRIG ARBUSTCI.

1

Where, in the Admiralty, two claims are made upon the fund in the registry of the
court, one arising from a mortgage given at a foreign port, and entesed upon the
vessel's register, for outfit and supplies for the voyage, and the other upon a bill
of lading executed by the master for the voyage, for specie received on board and
never delivered ; held, that the latter has priority over the former in the distribution of the fund.

The.brig Arbustci having been libelled for seamen's wages, and
for a bottomry bond, and having been sold by process of the court,
and those claims satisfied, there remained remnants and surplus in
the registry of the court. Two classes of petitioners contested their
priority of right to the fund, the demands of each exceeding its
entire amount. Fairbanks & Co. held a mortgage, executed in
Nova Scotia, to secure a debt incurred there for her outfit and supplies for the voyage, notice of which mortgage was entered on her
register. The libellants held a bill of lading, executed by the master during that voyage, for specie shipped on board and never
delivered.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BETTS, J.-That the claim of the libellants was a clear maritime
lien upon the vessel. That the mortgagees have a competent legal
authority to litigate their right to the fund representing the vessel,
although the court could give them no direct remedy against the
vessel by way of foreclosure of the mortgage, or otherwise. That
the libellants having a lien upon the vessel, have a priority over the
mortgagees. That the principle is not changed by the fact that the
foundation of the mortgage was a debt of a maritime character,
accruing for labor and materials furnished by the mortgagees to the
vessel. They could claim no priority over, if, indeed, their position
was as advantageous as that of an unsecured material man, as by
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